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Abstract: This article evaluates the gains but also the losses of the set-theoretical ontology Badiou 
develops in Being and Event, in order to stress the importance of the shift to a concern with 
appearance and difference in Logics of Worlds. It is argued that this shift suggests a possible 
rapprochement between Badiou’s philosophy of the event on the one hand and postcolonial critical 
race theory on the other. This is explored through an evental reading of the so-called ‘Morant Bay 
Revolt’ that took place in Jamaica in 1865. The article closes by exploring some of the overlaps 
between Badiou’s development of an ‘objective phenomenology’ in Logics of Worlds, and Frantz 
Fanon’s elaboration of a phenomenology of race in Black Skin, White Masks. 
 
I will take the opportunity afforded by this special issue to develop an argument I began in Badiou in 
Jamaica: The Politics of Conflict (Wright: 2013). There, I referred to the rich and complex history of 
anti-colonial resistance on the Caribbean island of Jamaica, in order to direct certain critical 
questions at the philosophical framework constructed by Badiou in Being and Event (2005). The way 
that work was being read at the time, at least in Anglophone academia, implied some potential 
limitations to its political purchase: 
 
1) Understood as an absolute or Grace-like singularity, the event seemed to militate against 
any critical analysis of the hierarchies of power, inequality and injustice prior to its irruption. 
2) The related insistence on the a-(or indeed anti-)historical status of the event seemed to 
negate ‘historicity’ in the Marxist sense of the movement of dialectical change already 
underway in a given conjuncture. 
3) If conceived too starkly, Badiou’s version of the Lacanian separation between ‘individual’ 
and ‘subject’ seemed to downplay the importance of day-to-day resistance and its possible 
relation to the emergence of a truth. 
4) Badiou’s faith in the faithful subject’s ability to break with its ontological determination by 
the ‘state of a situation’ seemed in danger of tipping over into voluntarism. 
5) Finally, Badiou’s relegation of ‘culture’ to a mere synonym for the given, the banal or the 
quotidian, seemed to preclude any notion of a progressive cultural politics. 
 
In what follows, I want to stress the extent to which the “objective phenomenology” (Badiou: 2009, 
p. 38) developed in Logics of Worlds addresses many of these tensions, which are in fact the very 
ones driving, rather than contradicting, Badiou’s philosophical project. Further, I want to argue that 
Logics of Worlds opens up, in a way that its predecessor does not, a possible rapprochement with a 
field otherwise totally at odds with Badiou’s work: postcolonial theory and, as part of that, critical 
race theory. 
The value of exploring what Badiou can offer to postcolonial theory stems not from some 
perceived need to defend a discipline whose accommodation by the academy, as Gayatri Spivak has 
argued (1999), is hardly without paradoxes or drawbacks. Rather, it stems from their shared 
commitment to a politics of radical transformation and their common ‘conditioning’ by forms of 
subjectivity able to force such a politics. With the postcolonial theorist and historian Robert Young 
(2001), I consider postcolonial theory - when not mired in a problematic ‘culturalism’ Badiou in fact 
helps us to be critical of - to be a living inheritance of anti-colonial activism that can and should have 
contemporary relevance. As postcolonial critical race theory shows, the ‘worlding’ of today’s 
globalised ‘world’ involves a viciously spatialised and racialised stratification, whether in the 
outsourcing of industrial and sweatshop labour, or in patterns of criminal incarceration or of mental 
health problems (Brown: 2003). Like modern roads built over ancient trade routes, this racialised 
stratification follows the contours left by European colonialism within a form of globalisation that 
might justifiably be termed neo-colonial, albeit with due attention to the differences (Rao: 2000). A 
philosophy that claimed to be for militants (Badiou: 2015) yet was unable to engage with this 
contemporary reality would surely fail to live up to its ambition to ‘compossibilise’ political as well as 
other kinds of truths? This is the crux of the matter I wish to explore here: how can the power of 
philosophical abstraction, re-modelled on the rigour of set-theoretical mathematics in Being and 
Event, be put to work in the always particular, always historically conditioned, and always culturally 
encoded (postcolonial) world? I believe Logics of Worlds has much better answers to these questions 
than Being and Event. 
After outlining the importance of the shift from one to the other then, I would like to return 
to the Jamaican example in order to explore the value of Badiou’s ontology and his logic for the 
development of a theorisation of colonialism, race and resistance, which may yet be of use to 
contemporary anti-capitalist struggles. I will then close with some brief reflections on some 
surprising points of contact between Badiou’s elaboration of an ‘objective phenomenology’ in Logics 
of Worlds on the one hand, and Frantz Fanon’s use of a more traditional phenomenology in Black 
Skin, White Masks (1986) on the other. It is my modest hope that by the end of this discussion the 
notion of a ‘Badiouian critical race theory’ might sound less like an out and out oxymoron. 
 
From Ontological Deadlocks to the Appearance of Difference 
 
There can be little doubt that Being and Event is a profound intervention into the history of Western 
philosophy. The grandiosity of its title, self-consciously aligning it with Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(Heidegger: 1998) and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (Sartre: 2006), is actually fully justified. More 
rigorously than any other thinker before him, Badiou takes seriously the ancient Greek ontological 
problematic - at the core of the constitutive tension between philosophy and sophism (see Cassin: 
2001) - of Being as Oneness or unity. But Badiou audaciously interprets the One of Being as the 
result of a formal process, a counting operation, a ‘one-ing’ that can be newly understood in the 
wake of mathematical developments in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. Thus, 
Georg Cantor’s invention of set-theory and its subsequent formalisation by Zermelo-Fraenkel 
becomes an immensely powerful conceptual toolkit for abstracting the axiomatic co-ordinates of any 
set. Or rather, of what Badiou chooses to call a situation. Everything at stake in Being and Event is 
arguably crystallised in this barely acknowledged rhetorical move from set to situation. For Badiou’s 
wager (one of his favourite Pascalian terms of course) is that the completely abstract, axiomatic and 
resolutely empty attributes of a mathematically conceived set can be transposed, intact, to a 
‘situation’ in the social, political, cultural and ultimately phenomenologically lived and experienced 
sense. So if mathematical sets involve generative axioms, such as those governing the universal 
inclusion of a void multiple (axiom of foundation), or the belonging of the elements of subset to sets 
(axiom of extension), then the same can be said of what makes any situation into a situation distinct 
from others, whether that be a group of paintings, a political rally, a football team, or a galaxy.  
There are enormous gains from this radical move. Firstly, set-theoretical ontology can 
literally be applied to anything that ‘is’, as long as what ‘is’ is accepted as the result of a counting 
operation that turns a multiple into an element that belongs to a set or situation. Precisely because 
set-theory brackets out particularising predicates, the scope of its potential relevance is unlimited. 
Secondly, with set-theory something positive can still be said of the nature of Being-qua-being 
‘outside’ of or ‘before’ this counting operation (scare quotes to indicate that these are necessarily 
metaphorical notions), namely, that Being-qua-being is ‘pure inconsistent multiplicity’ (Badiou: 2005, 
p.28). This position helps Badiou to avoid the pitfalls of extreme idealism or indeed postmodern 
relativism. Yet, thirdly, such an ontological claim is but a negative inference from the fact that our 
only access to this pure multiplicity is via consistent multiples counted within situations. This novel 
take on Heidegger’s ontico-ontological difference manages to avoid both essentialist positions and 
the residually Cartesian traps of Dasein. Fourthly however - and this is much more important for 
Badiou’s overarching political project it seems to me - the transition between set and situation 
ensures two things: that situations must have ‘states’ (another carefully chosen term which puts 
Cantor into unlikely dialogue with Lenin) the role of which is to gather into an overarching One all 
the ones that belong to a situation; but also that this ‘state’ can never succeed in making belonging 
and inclusion coincide fully enough to account entirely for the totality of the situation it supposedly 
‘governs’. The necessary inclusion of a void-multiple, for example, means that the state of a situation 
must actively dis-count a kind of extimate ‘real’ in the Lacanian sense, one that threatens its 
imaginary coherence yet cannot not be included. For this reason, there will always be elements on 
the ‘edge of the void’ (Badiou: 2005, p.175). In other words, the set-theoretical ontology elaborated 
in the first half of Being and Event ensures that radical change may be rare, unforeseeable and 
fragile, but it is always formally possible. This is what paves the way for the concept of the event 
developed in the second half.  
However, it may also be here that the greatest philosophical gains tip over into certain 
political losses. For to be an event, an event must also not be one, or rather, it must not be One: it 
cannot count for the reigning state of the situation. It must be utterly unpredictable, the preserve of 
no particular group, including sociological class, and have no history. Only if faithful subjects gather 
around its name can the event force a recount, allowing it to exist in what will necessarily be a new 
situation. To be sure, there is something very appealing, some would say (neo)Romantic (Osborne: 
2007), about this insistence on the possibility of radical novelty in an era depressingly dominated by 
the neoliberal consensus, a situation which Badiou will later capture very well with the concept of 
‘atonic worlds’ devoid of points (Badiou: 2009, p.420). Yet it is perhaps here that one might hint at a 
kind of postcolonial critique – or at least contextualisation – of Badiou’s philosophy. Is not Badiou’s 
central concept of the event and the universal very European, and moreover very French? He clearly 
comes out of a Republican intellectual tradition that tends to take the French Revolution as universal 
exemplar of the universal itself, notwithstanding his efforts to articulate a longer history, from 
Spartacus’s slave revolt to Münster’s peasant war, and to step outside the European frame of 
reference through his close engagement with the Chinese Cultural Revolution (although as I have 
argued elsewhere, Badiou’s Maoism is unsurprisingly very French as well – Wright: 2015).  
Nevertheless, it does not follow that one could undertake a simplistic critique of the 
‘blindspots’ caused by Badiou’s unacknowledged Eurocentrism, in that mechanistic gesture 
characteristic of the lazier parts of poststructuralist postcolonial theory. A far from lazy version of 
this approach can be found in Susan Buck-Morss’ important critique of Hegel’s omission of Haiti 
from his philosophical post-mortem on the French Revolution (Buck-Morss: 2009). And yet in 
Badiou’s very particular case, it is precisely his recourse to set-theory that has profound 
consequences for that Eurocentric conception of the universal itself, but without simply destroying it 
in favour of relativism, localism or Wittgensteinian language games. Taking his cue from Bertrand 
Russell’s well-known critique of Frege, but also drawing on Lacan’s related assertion that ‘there is no 
other of the Other’, Badiou demonstrates the incoherence of any universal proclaiming itself to be 
the ‘set of all sets’, the ‘meta-set’ capable of containing all others, with major theological, 
philosophical but also political consequences. And yet it is simultaneously set-theory that also 
grounds Badiou’s faith in the universal, understood now as a generic logic on which a truly 
egalitarian politics can be built. In this sense it as if, on the issue of the universal at least, Badiou can 
have his French Revolutionary cake and eat it. And yet there are both gains and losses: because the 
set-theoretical universal can only be universal for a particular situation, never for all situations, it is 
always entangled in the sedimented history, culture and phenomenological complexity that makes a 
situation that situation.  
Toussaint L’Ouverture’s appropriation of the metropolitan revolutionary discourse inflaming 
Parisians in the 1790s was clearly vital to the astonishing success of the first ever Black Revolution 
(Aristide: 2008 and James: 2001). Yet the persuasiveness of his discourse also had much to do with 
the tradition of slave resistance evident in the rich history of revolts and rebellions in Haiti and 
across the Caribbean: such was the existing terrain that gave his egalitarian words traction there. 
The extension of a generic logic into the Haitian situation obviously involved passing through the 
specific colour-coded relations of domination, subordination and marginalisation constitutive of 
Saint Domingue as it was then called. Notwithstanding the gains already acknowledged then, it is not 
at all clear that important things are not lost in the translation of this lived complexity into the 
language of sets, subset and their elements: race in particular does not seem well served by this 
terminology, and the same could be said of those other mainstays of cultural studies such a sex, 
gender and class. The very power of abstraction and formalisation at the centre of Being and Event 
threatens to flatten out or render irrelevant the granular particularities of, dare we say it, ‘real’ 
situations that give the universal its site-specific form. Does not the example of Saint Domingue 
already indicate that race is not so much a matter of Being, as of Being-there? Hence the importance 
of the developments in Logics of Worlds. 
Even though Being and Event offered a kind of mathematical guarantee for the possibility of 
change, the affirmation of an ‘excrescent multiple’ beyond the state’s count remained in some sense 
flat, a matter of ‘in’ or ‘out’ intrinsic to the axiomatic logic of sets. The project of Logics of Worlds, by 
contrast, is to bring the question of Being into relation with the, as it were, ‘three-dimensional’ 
question of gradated modalities of existence: where is this element in relation to others, how does it 
appear, with what relative intensity? Badiou enacts this change of emphasis, from Being to Being-
there, through another terminological shift, this time from ‘situation’ to ‘world’, thereby invoking 
the essentially phenomenological issue of appearance. Objects not only belong to a world, they 
appear somewhere within it. As with set-theory, where we too readily imagine the set as a kind of 
sack holding discrete elements that pre-existed their container (we should instead think of axioms 
that simultaneously gather and produce elements), so with the notion of ‘worlds’, we are always 
tempted to imagine a kind of empty panoramic landscape that is then filled with the objects said to 
be ‘in’ that world. The new use Badiou makes of category-theory in Logics of Worlds, a branch of 
mathematics particularly well suited to the thinking of relations, allows him to insist that “’in’ is 
[only] a metaphor for the localization of multiples” (Badiou: 2009, p.102). In other words, for a 
multiple to appear in or as part of a world it must have been subjected to a logical operation that 
gives it a place in that world, allowing it to appear as an object among other objects.  
Badiou calls this logical operation the ‘transcendental’ of a world, and identifies three major 
functions: 
 
1) The minimum: the ‘least’ or ‘weakest’ mode of appearance that is still nonetheless in or of a 
world, to the extent that not appearing can still be considered a mode of appearing 
2) The conjunction: the intensity of appearance of two objects which can be related without 
mutual cancellation, so that they can appear side-by-side in a mutually reciprocal or 
‘commutative’ relation that preserves their difference 
3) The envelope: the global synthesis of any number of such objects and their conjunctions, 
including an infinity of them. Being and Event had already used set-theory to postulate 
infinities of different sizes (2005: p.142), and here category-theory helps to underline the 
transitive nature of ‘worlding’ (see Badiou: 2009, p.103) 
 
These transcendental functions provide the outlines of a novel philosophical method that Badiou 
refers to, in a pleasingly paradoxical formulation, as an “objective phenomenology” (p.38). For 
readers familiar with Badiou’s trajectory, this comes as something of a surprise given the break with 
his very early Sartrean phase, but the qualifier ‘objective’ is obviously crucial. On the one hand, in 
Logics of Worlds he now shares with the phenomenological tradition an interest in the bracketing or 
epochē of worldly perceptions and meaning-based interpretations, in order to access the underlying 
conditions of possibility that allow objects to appear at all, to become phenomena. On the other 
hand, Badiou does not want to retain from that tradition either the Kantian understanding of the 
‘transcendental’ which can be seen as a subjective idealism; or the Husserlian emphasis on 
intensionality that remains fundamentally Cartesian; or finally the existential phenomenology of 
Heidegger which tends towards notions of ‘authenticity’ and begins from the presupposition of 
Dasein. Contra in particular to Merleau-Ponty’s proximity to embodied perception and the 
dominance of the visual, Badiou wants to bend phenomenology to his own aim of an ‘atomic logic’ 
that needs no ‘knower’ or ‘perceiver’ per se. His objective phenomenology then steps outside of 
psychological but also epistemological problems in order to enable “a description without a subject” 
(Badiou: 2009, pp.38-39). The surprising echo of Althusser in this formulation has to be qualified in 
so far as objective phenomenology leaves room for the possibility of a non-Cartesian subject of truth 
to emerge.   
In this idiosyncratic understanding of phenomenology, objects exist neither simply in 
people’s heads as perceptions of empirical reality or as illusions, nor indeed outside worlds in some 
other metaphysical realm, although they can exist in other worlds than the one they currently 
appear in, especially human ‘objects’, to which Badiou refers rather poetically as “the being of a 
thousand logics” (2009, p.114). What existence objects have, therefore, is always ‘in’ a world as part 
of a relational network of other objects. And as in Being and Event, there is no over-arching world of 
all worlds. It is precisely this “inexistence of the Whole” (p.109) that begs the phenomenological 
question of what logical operations turn Being-qua-being into a being or an existant within an 
enveloping but never totalised world? If the emphasis on the generic in Being and Event derived its 
power from the Platonic category of the Same, Logics of Worlds is much more concerned with 
difference. The transcendental appearance of an object becomes the product of two intersecting 
axes of differentiation: self-difference, which endows an object with the isolatable identity that 
distinguishes it from pure difference or radical multiplicity; and relational difference, which localises 
that identity there in a gradated, modulated world of other identities. 
This new interest in difference in itself hints at some possible intersections with postcolonial 
theory, where the concept of difference, whether as différance or as the cultural difference 
supposedly recognised within liberal multiculturalism, has been central, but also deeply problematic 
(see Hallward: 2001). I will return to this in my concluding comments, but let us now explore these 
issues not through abstract theory, but via the example of colonial Jamaica. 
 
The Ontology of Resistance in Jamaica 
In Badiou in Jamaica: The Politics of Conflict (Wright: 2013), I made the case for something like a set-
theoretical approach to colonial but especially imperial modes of sovereignty in order to make sense 
of Jamaica’s evolving forms of inclusion within the British Empire. Set-theory can foreground the role 
of the ‘state’ of the imperial situation as being concerned with a counting operation that not only 
counts innumerable multiples as one (territories, plantations, slaves, ships, exchangeable goods, 
slave owners, colonial administrators etc.), but also attempts to count that count as part of an 
overarching set - an Empire in other words, which in the British case famously grew large enough for 
the sun supposedly never to set on it. Thus, set-theory can redescribe imperial power as adhering to 
the axiom of extension, which ensures that the multiples that are elements of a sub-set must also 
belong to the set of which that sub-set is a part (Badiou: 2005, p.60). During the slave period in 
Jamaica, this allowed slaves to be included in the Empire, albeit fundamentally in the form of 
‘chattel’. This can be represented very simply as follows: 
Situation:  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
State of the Situation:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such is the transitive operation of the imperial count. However, set-theory can also help to 
redescribe outbreaks of anti-colonial resistance, such as slave revolts or post-abolition riots, as the 
emergence of ‘excrescent’ multiples that belong to, but cannot be included by, the reigning imperial 
state. The axiom of excess for example, which demonstrates that inclusion will always be massively 
in excess of belonging (Badiou: 2005, p.81), is in productive tension with the axiom of extension, 
thereby suggesting the ontological possibility of such irruptions of the uncountable.  
In Badiou in Jamaica: The Politics of Conflict (Wright: 2013), I developed a sort of set-
theoretical taxonomy of several conflicts in Jamaican history – the first ‘Maroon War’ (1655-1731), 
‘Tacky’s Rebellion’ (1760), the ‘Sam Sharpe Rebellion’ (1831) and the ‘Morant Bay Revolt’ (1865)as 
well as the struggles around national independence – in order to distinguish between those conflicts 
that simply entrenched the very terms of imperial power on the one hand, and those with more 
evental consequences on the other. Thanks to the ultimate ungovernability of any situation, I 
presented the evolving forms of imperial sovereignty - ranging from colonies to dependencies, from 
mandates to protectorates, and on to the weak set of the British Commonwealth – as so many 
transformations in inclusion induced by these disruptive sequences. This in turn helps to clarify the 
‘two Empires’ theory common within histories of the British Empire (James: 1998), the first of the 
two empires being the territorial usurpation and raw super-exploitation of the colonial period, the 
second being the later imperial phase in the Nineteenth century, when an ideological project of 
British Empire 
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Colonies ∈ British Empire: the 
colonies belong to the British 
Empire as multiples that compose it, 
and are therefore among its 
presented elements. They count as 
one. 
 
Slaves ⊂ British Empire: the slaves 
are included in the British Empire as 
parts of the subset of the colonies 
which, in turn, are elements of the 
Empire. The axiom of extension is 
satisfied insofar as the parts of the 
subset are also elements of the set. 
Slave-ones are counted as One. 
 
‘civilising’ colonial subjects came to the fore. In other words, as the European Empire began to 
legitimate itself on the basis of a kind of universalism, drawing on both Christian universalism and in 
some ways a distorted appropriation of the secular universalism of the French and American 
Revolutions, it could no longer sustain the ontological difference of the count that had separated the 
enslaved from the free, the colonised from the colonisers, and the periphery from the metropole.  
Just as importantly, set theory also makes it possible to identify the ontological grounds for 
presenting such otherwise momentous changes as the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, 
emancipation in 1833, and even formal political independence for Jamaica in 1962, as little more 
than what Badiou calls simulacral events: that is to say, disruptions in which there is the often 
spectacular outward appearance of change, but an underlying ontological continuity. His usual 
example is Hitler’s National Socialism as a simulation of the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, 
borrowing as it did the emphasis on mass mobilisation and the militant party as well as a certain 
(anti-Semitic) critique of capitalism in the name of the workers etc. (Badiou: 2002). However, 
beyond this European example, the concept of a simulacral event is surely relevant to the bitter-
sweet experience of independence and decolonisation for many former colonies in the mid-
Twentieth century. It was this lesson in the profound difference between reform and revolution, 
between formal freedom and its actuality, that drove the development of postcolonial approaches 
to the critique of political economy, such as dependency theory and world-systems theory (Young: 
2001).  
Moreover, the suspension of qualifying predicates characteristic of set-theory also implies 
some political cul-de-sacs that postcolonial theory itself has not been adept at avoiding, in so far as it 
has not always resisted the temptations of identity politics. Thanks to the at once Maoist and set-
theoretical definition of truly transformative politics as an ontological break, upon which Badiou 
insists so stubbornly, it becomes obvious that building a claim on the basis of a quality already 
counted by the State of the situation cannot, in and of itself, ground a truly emancipatory politics. 
This accounts for Badiou’s caution about phenomena like the négritude movement associated with 
Léopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire, and for his related dismissal of cultural forms of politics (see 
Bosteels: 2005, p.258). Any such politics of identity, predicated in négritude on the militant assertion 
of a noble black essence, cannot logically partake of the truly egalitarian power of the generic 
universal.  
I will come back to this question later, but it may be here that we encounter, once again, 
conceptual or theoretical gains that threaten to tip over into political losses. For any analysis of anti-
colonial resistance, including sequences with good claims to being evental, cannot help but both 
deploy and pass through race, racism and their inextricable entanglement in the colonial or imperial 
count, such that though fraught with dangers, the strategies of négritude may well be subjectively 
important. This is why the theory of appearance developed by Badiou in Logics of Worlds adds a 
crucial dimension to set-theoretical ontology, helping us to theorise the Being-there of racialised 
appearance.  
 
The Appearance of Race in the Morant Bay Revolt 
 
Let us now explore this through the example of just one of Jamaica’s sequences of conflict, the 
‘Morant Bay Revolt’ of 1865. Since most readers will not be familiar with this incident, I will begin 
with a breakdown of its key elements in chronological order: 
 
a) On the 8th of October, 1865, in a court house in Morant Bay in the South-Eastern corner of 
Jamaica, one Lewis Miller was prosecuted for trespassing after going into a neighbour’s 
pasture to recover his horse. When the verdict of guilty was reached, an angry crowd that 
had gathered outside the courthouse to protest previous injustices caused a major 
disturbance. This crowd was led by Paul Bogle, a Baptist deacon and political agitator who 
had been denouncing the appalling conditions for poor blacks in Jamaica from the pulpit of 
his church, and who had gathered a significant following, as well as support from one of the 
few coloured representatives in the Jamaican House of Assembly, George William Gordon. 
The magistrates in the court house issued 28 arrest warrants that day, including one for 
Bogle, but after scuffling broke out, Bogle escaped with most of his followers and returned 
to his home village of Stony Gut.  
b) Three days later, Bogle and fully four hundred followers marched back into Morant Bay to 
resume their protest. They ransacked the police station before moving on to the court 
house. A volunteer militia had been organised to meet them there, and as they approached, 
a volley was fired into the crowd killing ten people. Nonetheless, they drove on into the 
court house, set fire to the school and adjoining buildings and released fifty-two prisoners 
from the jail house. Policemen, prison guards and legal clerks were hacked to pieces with 
machetes and beaten to death with clubs. 
c) The rioting and killing continued into the following day, spreading out into the whole parish 
of St. Thomas-in-the-East. The day after that, the 13th, the governor of the island, Edward 
John Eyre, declared martial law, although he restricted it to the county of Surrey and 
excluded from within this zone the city of Kingston. Troops were immediately deployed and 
bloody fighting continued for ten days until a Maroon regiment captured Paul Bogle on the 
23rd of October. The following day, Bogle was court-marshalled and hanged. 
d) Prior to Bogle’s execution, George William Gordon had been arrested on the 17th of October 
in Kingston, which was still under civil jurisdiction, and then transferred to Morant Bay 
where martial law operated. There he faced a court martial rather than a civil trial and, being 
found guilty of sedition and treason, was executed on the same day that Bogle was 
captured. The martial law by which Gordon was condemned to death stayed in effect until 
the 13th of November, by which time the ‘rebellion’ had been largely suppressed. 
e) News of the ‘rebellion’ in Jamaica was met in Britain, initially, by relief that one of the 
Crown’s most valuable possessions had been saved from near destruction. Yet as details of 
Governor Eyre’s use of martial law emerged, particularly in relation to the execution of 
Gordon, murmurs of concern turned into a full-scale public outcry. Prodded into action by 
the Jamaica Committee (formed specifically in response to Morant Bay and boasting high-
profile members such as the philosopher and economist, John Stuart Mill), the Colonial 
Office launched a Royal Commission into the disturbances. When this Commission 
concluded in April 1866, it found that the death penalty had been used too freely, that 
floggings had been unnecessarily vicious and sustained, and that the burning of over 1,000 
homes of poor blacks was excessively cruel. Governor Eyre was dismissed but, much to the 
chagrin of the Jamaica Committee, he never faced trial for the murder of Gordon (although 
he was unsuccessfully tried for ‘high crimes and misdemeanours’). 
f) The British Government’s political response to Morant Bay was to dissolve the Jamaican 
House of Assembly, which had previously enjoyed independent executive power, and to 
impose on the island the ignominy of Crown Colony rule (rule directly from Westminster). 
The new Legislative Council that replaced it was composed overwhelmingly of metropolitan 
officials and lacked even the modicum of ‘popular’ representation the previous Assembly 
had had. That is, the sovereignty, both legal and administrative, of the mother country was 
reasserted through the inclusion of the Jamaican subset into the imperial set. As Sherlock 
and Bennett have put it, “‘Massa’ was still there, but the crown was now in control” (1998, 
p.265).  
g) As Kostal (2005) has exhaustively documented, the events at Morant Bay led to a lively, 
long-lasting and ultimately unresolved journalistic as well as scholarly debate in Britain as to 
the history, definition and morality of martial law as a tool of metropolitan and imperial 
statecraft.  
 
The set-theoretical framework of Being and Event arguably only gets us so far with understanding 
this sequence. To now draw on Logics of Worlds as well, it is helpful to foreground two new concepts 
introduced in that book: the notion of the ‘subject body’ (Badiou: 2009: p. 455), and that of the 
‘obscure subject’ (p.58). The subject body is “composed of all the elements of the site […] that 
subordinate themselves, with maximal intensity, to that which was nothing and becomes all” 
(p.468). By contrast, the obscure subject attempts to occult such a subject body by replacing it with 
“a full and pure transcendent Body, an ahistorical or anti-evental body (City, God, Race …)” (pp.59-
60). This last, very rare references to race by Badiou, helps us to link these notions to two distinct 
phases that can be discerned within the Morant Bay sequence. Firstly, the truth-sequence which 
lasted from October 8th to October 23rd 1865 (a-d above), during which the ‘subject-body’ of Bogle’s 
black peasant army briefly emerged into maximal rather than minimal appearance, its numbers 
growing as fidelity to the truth of black exploitation was transmitted to other blacks (what was 
nothing became all). This black subject-body, however, dissolved with Bogle’s execution and a re-
assertion of racialised inequality. Secondly then, the obscure-sequence which I would argue lasted 
from October 13th 1865 to April of 1866 (d-g above). It was during this time that the reactionary 
subjectivity of Governor Eyre, and the use of martial law, attempted to completely obscure this 
evental black subject-body by re-asserting the obscure body of imperial sovereignty through the 
dissolution of the Jamaican Assembly and the imposition of Crown Colony rule. Race is demonstrably 
central in all this, but how? 
Certainly, the cry ‘colour for colour!’ was repeatedly heard among the black participants in 
the Morant bay incident, as well as an inversion of racist indiscrimination: “we don’t know one 
buckra [white person] from another, we will kill them all” (Heuman: 2000, p.7). Yet the complicated 
chromatism which still effects Jamaican society to this day, and which has long necessitated 
distinctions between ‘black’, ‘brown’ and ‘white’ that double as class indicators (as disturbingly 
demonstrated in the practice of ‘whitening’ black skin by means of carcinogenic bleach), meant that 
the demand ‘colour for colour’ was difficult in practice to enforce: those of suspect skin-hue and 
therefore allegiance were forced by Bogle’s followers to swear an oath on the bible to ‘cleave to the 
blacks’. This already indicates that ‘the blacks’ was a subjective much more than it was an epidermal 
category. One should not therefore interpret this too quickly as an extreme form of identity politics. 
In the phenomenology developed in Logics of Worlds, such identity politics would automatically be a 
politics of included difference, appearing within the existing transcendental of that world. In fact, I 
would argue that poor blacks operated in the Jamaican world of 1865 just as Marx argued the 
proletariat in general operates within capitalism: in Contributions to the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right (Marx: 1970), he famously describes the proletariat as a class which has a 
universal character because its suffering is universal. It does not claim a particular redress because 
the wrong done to it is not a particular wrong, but wrong in general. This is not identity politics then. 
It is not as blacks in any essential sense, or for blacks in any communitarian sense, that Bogle’s 
followers rebel, but as those who are dis-counted within their world through blackness as a 
differential logic of appearance. Rather than the blackness filled by racist discourse with predicates 
such as ‘inferior’, ‘backward’, ‘physical not cerebral’, ‘uppity’ etc., this is the much more challenging 
because predicateless blackness of the void. In this sense, the suffering of poor Jamaican blacks that 
briefly attained maximal appearance in October 1865 condemned the entire colonial system, 
articulating the exploitative truth at its rotten core even post-emancipation (for crucially, these were 
manumitted ex-slaves, formally free blacks who rose up against the white supremacist oppression 
that made a mockery of that supposed freedom). It was this that caused such ripples well beyond 
Jamaica, posing a serious problem of legitimacy for the ‘mother country’, as evidenced by the 
debates around martial law (Kostal: 2005). 
Here, we seem to confront again the major tension between universal truths, and the locally 
situated, relational nature of truth-procedures, including the always local determination of multiples. 
How can Morant Bay articulate a universal truth when it is so clearly colour-coded? What is 
tremendously difficult, yet of paramount importance, is maintaining a term like ‘race’ as a descriptor 
of a purely formal, relational difference ordering the regime of appearance in the particular world of 
mid-Nineteenth century Jamaica. Overlaid, to be sure, by the discursive ‘racisms’ of which 
postcolonial critical race theory has made us rightly aware, this relational understanding of race has 
absolutely no ontological basis whatsoever. As a discourse of appearance par excellence, race is 
clearly a transcendental rather than an ontological problematic: “We will call ‘transcendental’ the 
operative ensemble which permits the giving of a sense of ‘more’ or ‘less’ to identities and 
differences in a determined world” (Badiou: 2009, p.127). No discussion of Jamaica, past or present, 
could ignore the role of race in this specific sense in establishing the ‘more’ and ‘less’ characterising 
the distribution of actual and symbolic capital in Jamaican society.  
Badiou’s emphasis on commutative relationality even in situations of conflict in Logics of 
Worlds, best exemplified in his account of the ‘Oka crisis’ (p.313) in Quebec in 1990, enables us to 
perceive racial antagonism as both violently structuring (making the situation ‘black and white’, one 
might say) and as a matter of mere appearances, both concrete, and without underlying essence. The 
maximal intensity of appearance which the existence of black exploitation suddenly embodied during 
the evental sequence of Morant Bay remains a relational intensity, and not a Spinozan, vitalist, 
ontological one. Far from allowing itself to be captured by the dominant transcendental inscription of 
‘blackness’, it is only as the abject yet defining (relational) Other of colonial white supremacist 
discourse that ‘blackness’ here has revelatory and transformative power. Difficult as this may be for 
many black Jamaicans then, and those generally enamoured of the négritude project and its legacies, 
this can have nothing directly to do with a lost, metaphysical ‘Africa’, with the ancient civilisations of 
Ethiopia or Egypt, or with the supposedly inherent qualities of African resistance to a tragic history of 
oppression (which does not prevent such claims having an important role to play in maintaining 
resistant individuals, to which the Rastafari movement in Jamaica is an eloquent testament). 
However, it is just as important to say that the logic of race itself cannot be somehow set aside 
altogether in resurrecting the evental logic of the Morant Bay Revolt. 
 
Towards a Badiouian Postcolonial and Critical Race Theory? 
 
 In order to further persuade the reader that a Badiouian critical race theory is feasible, I will 
conclude by pointing out, albeit very briefly, some suggestive points of contact and overlap between 
Badiou’s approach in Logics of Worlds and that of anti-colonial activist and theorist of racism, 
nationalism and decolonisation, Frantz Fanon. 
I have already mentioned Badiou’s early phenomenological influence coming via Sartre and 
his very late development of an ‘objective phenomenology’, so perhaps the overlaps I am indicating 
here could be said to stem from Fanon’s arguably related, though also very different, deployment of 
a phenomenological framework. Fanon studied under Merleau-Ponty in Lyon in France in the late 
1940s and was influenced by his Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty: 2012), but always 
looking beyond France, he quickly pushed Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the embodied nature of 
consciousness towards considerations of the lived and felt realities of racism in the colonies. 
Consciousness of the ‘Manichean world’ of the colony, rooted in the schema of the black body, is 
shown by Fanon to involve a dialectical interplay between seeing and being seen (and thus seeing 
oneself) always via a visible marker that indexes a putative inferiority. The skin, as the surface upon 
which the relations between self and Other are played out, becomes a prison, walling the black man 
up in his own abjected body: “the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal 
schema” (Fanon: 1986, p.112). Reciprocally, whiteness in the colonies appears to mark a ‘natural’ 
superiority - intellectual, cultural and moral – which legitimises the transcendental place of whites in 
the viciously divided world of the colony, yet simultaneously locks them, too, in a brittle, almost 
frozen identity. This use of phenomenology is probably clearest in those famous passages from Black 
Skin, White Masks (1986) in which the influence on Fanon comes less from Husserl or Merleau-
Ponty, and more from Hegel, specifically, the latter’s discussion of the master-slave dialectic in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel: 1977). Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (Sartre: 2006) also plays a 
part in Fanon’s arguments regarding the constitution of blackness via the gaze of the racist Other, 
and of the colonial subject via the coloniser’s violent repression. Indeed, at one point in Black Skin, 
White Masks, he declares, in a phrase that resonates poignantly with Logics of Worlds, that “I am the 
slave […] of my own appearance” (Fanon: 1986, p.116).  
Crucially, Fanon arrives by this phenomenological route at the very conclusion we have just 
inferred from Badiou’s Logics of Worlds, namely, that race cannot be approached as an ontological 
category. Though an early text, written long before his involvement with the FLN in Algeria, Fanon is 
clear in White Skin, Black Masks that ‘blackness’ is precisely a relational category, one unthinkable 
outside its binary relation to ‘whiteness’, both of which terms exist not at the level of being but at 
that of an appearance constructed by colonial domination: “The Negro is not” he famously says, 
“Any more than the white man.” (p.231). In Badiouian terms, we could say that racism is the 
transcendental logic that ensures that ‘blackness’ will always be less than the more that ‘whiteness’ 
must appear as in the colonial world. Racism is what ensures the “epidermalization of this 
inferiority” (p. 13) that endows the dignified, human black body, especially as an active political 
body, with a null degree of appearance. Yet Fanon would recognise the potential in Badiou’s own 
insistence that a null relation remains a relation, and on basing “the logical possibility of negation in 
appearance” (Badiou: 2009, p.107). Much of the later text, Wretched of the Earth (2001), explores 
the difficult dialectical transformation of such a null relation with a minimal appearance into the 
maximal appearance of a national independence movement, focussing particularly the redirecting of 
colonial violence.  
However, Fanon also takes his distance from the logic, if not the passion and commitment, 
of the négritude movement when it lapses into the ontology of blackness he refutes, both in Black 
Skin, White Masks and Wretched of the Earth where he is very critical of the related pitfalls of 
cultural nationalism (see the chapter entitled ‘The Pitfalls of National Consciousness’ in Fanon: 
2001). Like Badiou, Fanon is deeply suspicious of exclusively ‘cultural’ forms of politics, recognising 
that they often unwittingly inscribe rather than undo racialised differences. Thanks to his Marxism, 
in fact, Fanon is much more comfortable with just the kind of generic politics Badiou advocates, 
though he phrases it in the very different terms of a “new humanism” (Fanon: 1986, p. 9). For Fanon, 
this new humanism opposes to the alienation of the Manichean split dividing whites from blacks in 
the colonial world, the universal category of ‘Man’ (women, one would hope, would not be exempt). 
And yet, much more conscious of race than many of his French intellectual friends – indeed he felt 
betrayed not only by France as an imperial power that brutally supressed Algerian independence 
movements, but also by the many leftwing intellectuals who followed the Parti Communiste Français 
in arguing that Algeria must remain a département of France even long after the bloody Sétif 
massacre of 1945 – Fanon never simply dismissed the négritude approach altogether either. As Peter 
Ludis, stressing Fanon’s Hegelian debt, has recently argued: “Fanon affirms the importance of 
négritude as the mediating term in the movement from the individual to the universal precisely 
because he rejects any black ontology” (Ludis: 2015, p. 50). Tarrying with the putative negative of 
blackness, passing through it on the way to a négritude of appearance rather than of essence, is 
clearly not incompatible with an evental subjectivity. It is for this reason that Fanon, sounding very 
much like Badiou avant la letter, could write “the real leap consists in introducing invention into 
existence. In the world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself. I am a part of Being to 
the degree that I go beyond it” (Fanon: 1986, p. 229). Does this not acknowledge the logical 
importance of race, even for the generic subject that tries to break with a racist world, at the same 
time as suspending its supposed ontological essence? Have we not just seen this mediating role for 
race in the example of the Morant Bay revolt in Jamaica? 
To conclude then, if the ‘post’ of post-colonial theory can be interpreted in a properly 
evental way, relating not simply to the colonial past (which Fanon also refused to be defined by: “I 
am not a prisoner of history” (1986, p.229) he said), but to the eternal or infinite truths still carried 
by anti-colonial sequences, then a Badiouian critical race theory, drawing on the ‘objective 
phenomenology’ developed in Logics of Worlds, may yet provide a philosophy for militants who wish 
to force change on to a globalised but also neo-colonial world. 
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